Direct participation in hostilities and membership in an organized armed group are contested and controversial concepts. Recent developments in military and legal doctrine suggest that a more practicable account may supplement the valuable work of the ICRC in its Interpretive Guidance on Direct Participation in Hostilities in order to guide target analysis in the unconventional and civilianized operational environment of contemporary non-international conflicts. The purpose of this article is to extrapolate criminal law models of accessorial liability and co-perpetration in order to elucidate the concepts of direct participation in hostilities and membership in an organized armed group. What is proposed is an intelligenceled framework for target analysis that is grounded in military doctrine and based on a mixture of objective and subjective criteria derived from criminal law. This can foster a better understanding of the social dynamic that sustains on-going fighting which limits the scope for arbitrary and erroneous targeting decisions in doubtful situations.
III. THE ICRC INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES
As this diagram suggests, the ICRC interpretive guidance attempts to make a clear distinction between temporary loss of immunity from attack on the basis of direct participation in hostilities (i.e. targeting on the basis of threat), and most significantly, the complete loss of immunity from attack on the basis of a 'continuous combat function' which equates with de facto membership of an organised armed group (i.e targeting on the basis of status). 6 In other words, individuals who are directly participating in hostilities do not lose their civilian status, but, rather, may only be lawfully attacked 'for such time' as they are directly participating in hostilities.
In contrast, where an individual is considered to be a de facto member of an organized armed group, they will no longer be regarded a civilian per se, but neither will they be regarded as a combatant in the sense of having combatant's privilege, meaning that they can be subject to attack at any time and in any place and they may also be prosecuted under domestic criminal law for fighting in hostilities. Targeting on the basis of this status is therefore problematic for two main reasons. Firstly, there remains uncertainty surrounding the 6 Melzer, 'Keeping the Balance Between Military Necessity and Humanity', ibid, 887. The rationale for making such a distinction is based on an interpretation of Article 51 paragraph (3) of AP I to the effect an act or even acts of participation in hostilities, without becoming a member of an organized armed group, should not result in a continuous loss of protection from attack, but rather a temporary loss of protection 'for such time' as an individual directly participates. ICRC (Interpretive Guidance), ibid, 44 -45. This interpretation is premised on the notion that using past participation as an indicator of a future propensity to commit hostile acts in order to render a civilian targetable for the duration of the hostilities 'would blur the distinction between temporary activity-based loss of protection and continuous status-based loss of protection (due to continuous combat function) '. precise scope and meaning of what constitutes a 'continuous combat function'. Secondly, the Interpretive Guidance does not expressly identify the threshold at which status-based targeting may come into effect. This next section will briefly deal with the first issue whilst the second issue will be dealt with in the concluding section.
A. Membership of an organized armed group on the basis of exercising a 'continuous combat function'
In contrast to membership of State armed forces or other officially constituted irregular groups in the context of international armed conflicts, the notion of membership in an organised armed group operating in the context of non-international armed conflicts is a notion that has so far proved difficult to define due to its context-specific and irregular nature, i.e. not recognized in domestic law or formalized in custom. The status of 'irregulars' is unclear, and so more analysis is needed in order to clarify the parameters of civilian immunity. Indeed, it is problematic that civilian status is defined in opposition to what are essentially equivocal general categories that may be labelled in various ways, such as 'terrorists', 'guerrillas', 'unlawful combatants', 'unprivileged combatants' or 'criminals'.
In practice, membership of, or incorporation within an organized armed group is problematic vis-à-vis irregularly constituted groups because it can be based on a wide range of idiosyncratic, and, in some cases, involuntary features, such as clan or tribal-based associations, political or religious affiliations, or ethnic or family ties.7 Given the indeterminacy of these ties, the ICRC Interpretive Guidance proposes that 'membership in such groups cannot depend on abstract affiliation, family ties, or other criteria prone to error, arbitrariness or abuse'.8 Rather, the Interpretive Guidance attempts to make a categorical distinction between civilians participating in hostilities and membership of an organised armed group by adopting a narrow approach that equates membership with what it describes as a 'continuous combat function', or to put it another way, de facto or functional combatancy.
Hampson suggests that it is difficult to presume such functional combatancy on the basis of anything other than behaviour, and so this concept is just another type of behaviour test.9 Whilst this is not disputed, it is suggested that the range of conduct from which we may infer functional combatancy is by no means an uncontroversial issue, and, in part, this is because the significance that is to be attached to any given behaviour may be inextricably bound-up with the intention or motive underlying any given activity, the extent to which it can foreseeably cause harm, and the nature of its connection to a diffuse organisational structure geared towards hostilities. For example, as will be discussed below, when it comes to forms of joint criminal enterprise (JCE) or co-perpetration, it will be necessary not only to have intelligence going towards a subjective state of mind (i.e. intent to perpetrate a hostile act or to pursue a common hostile design), but that the acts performed are in some way directed to furthering an underlying common agreement, purpose or design to commit a harmful act.
Although the ICRC attempts to forge a clear distinction between direct participation in hostilities and membership in an organized armed group, the touchstone it uses to make this categorical distinction, namely the 'continuous combat function' element, is in part premised on the element of direct participation in hostilities, and, as will be discussed below, this category is itself highly contentious as it is regarded by some legal experts as being too narrow and nebulous to be applied in practice. ' Individuals whose continuous function involves the preparation, execution, or command of acts or operations amounting to direct participation in hostilities are assuming a continuous combat function '.10 Watkin argues that by creating the 'continuous combat function' test for membership, and then restricting its scope by tying it to a narrow definition of direct participation in hostilities not only disadvantages states engaged in hostilities with organized armed groups, but is unlikely to be found credible by the soldiers of states asked to apply such guidance.11 Accordingly, the next section will briefly summarise and then critique the direct participation in hostilities criteria, which is broadly summed up by the dictum that 'function determines the directness of the part taken in the hostilities', i.e. only broader approaches to harm, causation and belligerency are capable of working in practice.12 However, before that, it is worth noting that the Interpretive Guidance states that 'membership in an organized armed group begins in the moment when a civilian starts de facto to assume a continuous combat function for the 10 ICRC Interpretive Guidance (n 5) 25, 27, 33 34. At para 33: 'Consequently, under IHL , the decisive criterion for individual membership in an organized armed group is whether a person assumes a continuous function for the group involving his or her direct participation in hostilities (hereafter: "continuous combat function")' 11 Kenneth Watkin, 'Opportunity Lost: Organized Armed Groups and the ICRC "Direct Participation in Hostilities" Interpretive Guidance ' (2010) group'.13 In other words, they become members where they 'go beyond spontaneous, sporadic, or unorganized direct participation in hostilities'. 14 The Interpretive Guidance thus attempts to distinguish between direct participation and membership on the basis of the apparent frequency and timing of the acts in question.
However, without intelligence, soldiers operating at the tactical level would find it near impossible to distinguish between a civilian who participates in hostilities on a spontaneous, sporadic or unorganized basis (or what Watkin describes as participating on a 'persistently recurring basis')15 and a member of an organized armed group who performs a 'continuous combat function'. Indeed, the doctrinal notion of positive identification16 suggests that absent a direct and immediate lethal threat, assessing the existence of a 'continuous combat function', and even distinguishing it from many supportive forms of direct participation in hostilities, is a process that can only take place in the context of targeted operations that are planned at the operational level of command with the benefit of accurate and reliable intelligence as this allows for a variety of objective and subjective considerations to be taken into account in order to overcome reasonable doubt that an individual is not directly participating in hostilities or a member of an organized armed group.17 Furthermore, as will be discussed further below, in view of the ICRC's recognition that a civilian may cause harm, and thus be deprived of their immunity from attack 'for such time' as their activities form an integral part of, and are closely linked to a specific and co-ordinated military operation, the concept of 'continuous combat function' may not be regarded as the sole and definitive determinant of deprivation of immunity from attack on a continuous basis. 18 Rather, as it currently stands the Interpretive Guidance maintains the the existence of a 'grey area' that permits a broad margin of discretion to target civilians on a continuous basis. 
B. The elements of direct participation in hostilities: an overview
Firstly, the requisite 'threshold of harm' has to be met. In this regard, an act does not need to amount to a direct 'attack' per se, but rather an act reaches the requisite threshold where it is likely to affect adversely the military operations or military capacity of a party to an armed conflict or, alternatively, to inflict death, injury, or destruction. Secondly, there must be 'direct causation' between the act and the harm. In other words, there must be a direct causal link in the form of 'one causal step' between the act and the harm likely to result, either from that act or from a concrete and co-ordinated military operation that directly causes harm of which that act constitutes an integral part.21 Thirdly, there must be a 'belligerent nexus' between the act and the harm caused. This means that the act must be specifically designed to cause directly the required threshold of harm in support of a party to the conflict and to the detriment of another.22
Threshold of harm
According to the Interpretive Guidance, the requisite 'threshold of harm' is met where an act is likely to affect adversely the military operations or military capacity of a party to an armed conflict or, alternatively, to inflict death, injury, or destruction.23 Schmitt has criticized this criterion in that it is sets the threshold at too high a level and so does not adequately reflect military considerations. In particular, Schmitt suggests that this concept is under-inclusive for the reason that civilian contributions that generally enhance military capacity would not meet such a high threshold requirement. For example, the training and manufacturing processes involved in the use of improvised explosive devices are contributions to one side that will typically weaken its opponent, but do not prima facie fall within the ICRC's framework of direct participation in hostilities as they are insufficiently direct so as to be likely to adversely affect military operations or to inflict directly death, injury or destruction.24 Furthermore, Schmitt notes that within any definition of harm, it was important to make a distinction between acts that were directly related to the hostilities and acts that are criminal in nature. 25 21 ICRC (Interpretive Guidance) (n5), 55. This point is important in view of the fact that in hostilities, individuals and groups may take advantage of a breakdown in law and order to commit a range of petty and organized criminal offences, and this should not be confused with direct participation in hostilities or membership in an organized armed group.
One causal step
Although ICRC suggested that 'direct causation' means that harm be 'brought about in one causal step', this implies a contrario that there are also indirect forms of causation, but that these do not amount to causation for the purposes of participation in hostilities. To bolster this, the Interpretive Guidance initially embodies a tactical level focus by stating that an attack 'begins only once the deploying individual undertakes a physical displacement with a view to carrying out a specific operation', and that an attack 'ends once the individual in question has physically separated from the operation'.26 The 'one causal step' criterion is thus a seemingly narrow approach for distinguishing sufficiently 'direct' from insufficiently 'indirect' acts of participation.The coherence and plausibility of this 'one causal step' criterion has been called into question quite severely by legal experts on grounds of logic and pragmatism. Most notably, Schmitt argues that it represents an under-inclusive and contradictory approach to causation and suggests states are only likely accept a broader conception of causation that is pertinent to 'the realities of 21 st century battlefield combat.27
In terms of under-inclusivity, Schmitt notes that harm may be brought about by acts that are more than one step removed from an attack, and that indirectly contributing to capability may result in harm,28 for example through weapons production, logistical support and scientific as well as technological research and development. specific military operation'.41 This reasoning is problematic in that it assumes the existence of that which has first to be established, namely the existence of acts that are 'recognizable' as direct participation in hostilities. Acts such as firing a weapon in self-defence or as part of the commission of a criminal offence may seem objectively hostile, whilst activities actuating in harm, such as clandestine weapons production or planning and logistics, may not be immediately 'recognizable' as harmful and thus within the scope of direct participation in hostilities, even where they are occurring on an ongoing basis.
Belligerent nexus
According to the Interpretive Guidance, for an act to amount to direct participation in hostilities it must have a 'belligerent nexus' or a connection with the surrounding hostilities, otherwise it should be dealt with using law enforcement measures.42 Yet the Interpretive Guidance construes the notion of 'belligerent nexus' in a narrower fashion than that developed in international criminal law jurisprudence and is, therefore, not harmonious with this related and interconnected branch of public international law.43In particular, according to the Interpretive Guidance, to amount to direct participation in hostilities an act must not only be 'objectively likely' to injure or adversely affect the enemy, but it must also be 'specifically designed to directly cause the required threshold of harm in support of a party to the conflict and to the detriment of another'.44
Although the term 'specifically designed' connotes subjective intent, the Interpretive Guidance initially posits an objective standard that does not depend on the 'subjective' state of mind or 'hostile intent' of 'every participating individual'.45 Indeed, where there is a direct and immediate threat, then according to the Interpretive Guidance subjective considerations are not generally relevant.46Thus, according to the Interpretive Guidance, the belligerent nexus should be deduced 'objectively' from the acts themselves. However, this is a rather crude behaviour test which does not help to resolve difficulties facing armed forces in the face of uncertain facts, or in other words, how to establish that a person to be targeted is member of an organised armed group that belongs to a party to the conflict. Again, the proposition that the belligerent nexus should be deduced 'objectively' from the facts themselves is to assume that which has to be first established, namely, what are the 'recognizable acts' from which one can reliably infer a belligerent nexus.
Despite the proposition of an objective standard, the ICRC necessarily qualifies this by suggesting that subjective considerations may be relevant in calling into question 'the belligerent nexus of their conduct', but only in 'exceptional cases'.47 For example, this may be so 'when civilians are totally unaware of the role they are playing in the conduct of hostilities',48or situations involving self-defence or the commission of criminal acts unrelated to the surrounding hostilities. 49 However, in the context of unconventional and full-spectrum operational environment, subjective considerations may not be regarded as 'exceptional', but a key way, and in many cases, arguably the only way to overcome doubt as to participation or status and thus distinguish a continuum of violence 50 which may range from petty and organized crime, to isolated terrorists acts and then to combat activities. 51 Indeed, the Interpretive Guidance actually states that '[m]any activities during an armed conflict lack a belligerent nexus even though they cause a considerable level of harm',52 and furthermore that 'loss of protection against direct attack within the meaning of IHL, however, is not a sanction for criminal behaviour but a consequence of military necessity in the conduct 47 Ibid., 60. 
IV. DOCTRINAL AND STRATEGIC APPROACHES TO CONTEMPORARY OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS
Contemporary military doctrine suggests that where operational planners of offensive strikes, increasingly cyberspace, especially because there are increased pressures for civilians to play a variety of direct and indirect support roles within the often diffuse internal support structures of organized armed groups that are party to an armed conflict.59 In this type of environment, an intelligence-led approach is critical to avoid mistakes, especially in relation to whether or not a perceived individual-level threat is integrated into an enemy organisation that is organised militarily and which can actuate sufficiently intense collective violence.
As it is extremely difficult to distinguish between the auxiliaries, fighters and core leadership involved in hostilities from elements of the general population or mass base of popular support that may provide them with direct or indirect support, or who are neutral in the sense that their activities lack proximity or a nexus with surrounding hostilities,60 military doctrine advocates social network analysis (SNA) which seeks to 'understand the social dynamic that sustains on-going fighting'61 in terms of how individual and group functions are performed and how they connect to each other and change over time.62 SNA seeks to assess the intentions and motivations of individuals as well as the extent to which they contribute to the internal support structure of an organised armed group that is engaged in hostilities. In this way SNA is a crucial tool for avoiding positive identification errors and manipulation. As U.S. experience shows, strikes will often be deliberate and planned in advance as part of a coordinated joint forces effort overseen by joint staff over a targeting cycle that lasts from between twenty four to seventy two hours. 65 Accordingly, rather than responding to attacks in the 'fog of war', individual targets are usually identified in advance and their names are placed on secret 'kill lists'. In such cases, targets are known, identified and engagement actions may be scheduled against them for a specific time, or they may be planned without having a specific delivery time. Even with 'unplanned targets' that are engaged using expedited procedures, there will be pre-existing target analysis in the form of an initial decision not to place them on a target list, or to place them on a target list but not selecting them for engagement or engagement within the current targeting cycle.66 Where there is need for an immediate response, particularly with regards to 'time-sensitive targets', then 'dynamic' planning and engagement may take place over a reduced targeting cycle of twenty-four hours.67 Even though this may necessitate a more expedited target analysis at subordinate levels of operational command and control, it will still have to go through core pre-operational validation, prioritisation, mitigation and execution procedures, which will involve gathering intelligence, applying assessment criteria and using ISR to track and monitor the target as well as to assess options and risks involved in engaging the target. The ability to identify and fix a target allows for tactical patience and persistent ISR to observe and track individuals remotely over many hours, or even days, to confirm the existence of hostile intent.68 With regards to 'emerging targets', namely those that meet the criteria to be of complicity can be as wide as there is reliable intelligence and evidence to demonstrate such a link. Thus, if it is logical to propose that criminal acts with a nexus to surrounding hostilities can involve a multiplicity of persons contributing in a range of direct and indirect ways, then it is logical to make a similar proposition regarding hostile or belligerent acts.
Accordingly, individual crimes can be an expression of collective criminality and thus subject to penal repression in the same way that individual hostile acts can be an expression of collective hostility and thus subject to loss of immunity from attack. The difficulty in both respects lies in pinpointing the specific contribution that an individual makes to the collective enterprise and in this regard, criminal law is more highly developed than humanitarian law and can therefore serve to elucidate further its provisions relating to the parameters of immunity. Furthermore, it is suggested that criminal law, with its analytical focus on the objective and subjective elements of indirect participation and perpetration possesses less of a propensity towards collective guilt than humanitarian law as it currently stands. 76
Nevertheless, it is suggested that focusing on the different outcomes and functions of these interrelated branches of law is not sufficient to preclude cross-fertilization of models of complicity, especially given that they are related branches of international public law centred around protecting fundamental standards of humanity as well as public order and safety. : the manufacturers of poison gas were deemed to be not liable as accessories to war crimes on the basis that they did not have requisite knowledge of its end use. Furthermore, according to the United States War Crimes Tribunal, this knowledge could not be inferred as 'neither the volume of production nor the fact that large shipments were destined to concentration camps would alone be sufficient to lead us to conclude that those who knew of such facts must also have had knowledge of the criminal purposes to which this substance was being put'; See also Schabas, ibid, 844. 'participating in acts of war' so as to adequately balance the two above-mentioned 'combatancy-related presumptions'.
VI. EXTRAPOLATION OF CRIMINAL MODES OF LIABILITY

A. Accessorial liability and direct participation in hostilities
As discussed above criminal law models of accessorial liability and co-perpetration are relevant to the issue the issues of what constitutes direct participation in hostilities and membership in an organized armed group. Not only that, but as this approach is grounded in military doctrine it is suggested that it is practicable in the context of planned targeted operations. The framework of accessorial liability is a useful concept for elucidating the notion of direct participation in hostilities as forms of liability in this regard are derived from support given to the commission of a criminal wrong by a principal offender or perpetrator.
For example international and domestic systems of criminal law not only provide for principal liability for the person who directly perpetrates a crime, but also for forms of accessorial liability for support roles such as aiding and abetting, planning, instigating and ordering the perpetration or execution of a crime.84
Aiding and abetting
This section contributes to a general framework of target analysis which may be used to assess whether the indirect support activities provided by civilians comprising the general population, the mass base of popular support 85 and 'auxillaries' amount to direct participation in hostilities by extrapolating the objective and subjective elements of aiding and abetting as developed in international criminal law. 86 It is suggested that where there is intelligence or Beginning with the objective elements, according to ICTY jurisprudence, an individual will be liable as an accessory for aiding and abetting a crime where it is demonstrated that they offered practical assistance, encouragement or moral support to a principal offender or perpetrator and this has a substantial effect on the perpetration of their crime(s). Rather than implying a causal relationship, the accomplice must make a significant difference the commission of the criminal act by the principal before during or after its perpetration. In other words, the criminal act would have occurred in a different way had it not been for their factual contribution. 87 Generally, a 'substantial contribution' will be self-evident where there is proximity between acts of support and the direct perpetrators. 88 For example, in the Zyklon B Case before British Military Court Hamburg, arguments that the provision of poison gas to concentration camps amounted to general assistance for lawful purposes were rejected in view of evidence demonstrating that the owner and manager of a company which manufactured poison gas had provided training to the principal perpetrators in how to use it to kill humans in confined spaces and that they knew that the gas was to be used for the purpose of killing human beings. 89 The ICTY Appeals Chamber previously held that in cases of geographical or temporal remoteness it will be necessary to demonstrate that acts of support or assistance are 'specifically directed' towards the commission of a crime so as to ensure that there is a sufficient 'culpable link'. For example, a six-month delay between an individual being observed unloading weapons and a subsequent attack was considered to reduce the likelihood that these weapons were specifically directed towards assisting in this attack. law and municipal law and has found that specific direction does not constitute an additional and free-standing element of aiding and abetting liability.91 Nevertheless, it noted that specific direction may at times be factually implicit in a finding that an individual's provision of practical assistance amounts to a substantial contribution.92 Moving onto the subjective elements, for an individual to be liable for aiding and abetting it must be demonstrated that they know that their acts assist in the commission of the principal perpetrator's crime. 93 This means that they must have knowledge or awareness that the acts they performed assist in the commission of a specific crime by the principal and that they knew of the principal's intention Aiding and abetting will now be distinguished from another mode of liability relevant to this discussion, namely the liability of co-perpetrators who participate in a common plan in order to distinguish between temporary activity-based loss of immunity on the basis of direct participation in hostilities and status-based loss of immunity on the basis of individual membership of an organized armed group and exercising a continuous combat function. It is suggested that these frameworks are not necessarily focused on high-level accused but may be used flexibly to encompass those who participate in common plans as leaders and as subordinates, and furthermore, they may encompass small-scale to large-scale common purposes, for example killing on a village, town or regional, national or international level.
JCE and
They may be construed as widely as the strategic plan or common purpose to adversely affect military operations or military capacity itself, and this is an objective matter that should be properly defined and supported by intelligence. 97 Status-based targeting in this respect can only occur in the context of targeted operations where there is reliable intelligence that suggests the objective and subjective elements outlined below are in existence.
According to the ICTY jurisprudence on JCE, a plurality of persons that share an agreement, common purpose or common design should be identified, as should the general goal(s), temporal and geographical scope and intended victims of the common plan. This may be inferred from intelligence which suggests the existence of a common pattern.98
Furthermore, an individual should intentionally make a significant contribution to the commission or furtherance of this common purpose, or in some cases they must also have foresight that hostile acts outside the common purpose were likely to be committed'. 99 Similarly, under ICC jurisprudence, co-perpetration refers to a situation where there is a common plan or joint agreement between two or more persons. This can be inferred from circumstantial evidence.100 Furthermore, such persons must make 'essential contributions' to this plan in a combined and coordinated fashion.101 Co-perpetrators must have an awareness that the consequences of the common plan would occur in the ordinary course of events.102
Extrapolating the jurisprudence on JCE and co-perpetration suggests that those who physically perform hostile acts may not be considered as members of organised armed groups where these abovementioned conditions are not satisfied, but rather as direct participants in hostilities only in those circumstances where it can be established that they are aiding and In summary, where there is intelligence indicating that an individual shares the hostile intention(s) of other individuals party to a common plan to engage in hostilities, and makes substantial or essential contributions to its furtherance or achievement, then they may be subject to status-based targeting for the duration of hostilities as a member of an organised armed group as this hostile intent evinces a genuine and continuous combat function. 111 For those individuals who are participating in hostilities, but who do not share the hostile intention(s) of other individuals that are party to a common plan, then as this may be the equivalent of aiding and abetting, they may accordingly be subject to threat-based targeting for such time as they are participating in, or making substantial contributions to hostile acts but no longer. This approach does not advocate the need to prove these extrapolated elements for establishing membership in an organized armed group beyond reasonable doubt in battlefield context. Rather, it is suggested that where there is doubt as to any of these elements, then it is reasonable to resolve it through a process of careful verification112 otherwise continuous status-based loss of protection based merely on a slight suspicion, and without 'objective' manifestations of hostile force or actions, could serve to undermine and erode the fundamental principle of distinction in non-international armed conflicts involving diffuse organisational structures. 113
Instigating an act
The concept of instigating, soliciting or inducing the commission of criminal acts can be considered to be relevant for targeting the core leadership as well as the political or ideological cadre and the auxiliaries of an organized armed group. Accordingly, the objective and subjective elements of this mode of liability will be extrapolated to the notion of participation in hostilities.
The objective elements of instigation are prompting another person to commit a hostile act'.114 Targeting an accessory to a perpetrator in this regard will arise only where instigation leads to the actual commission of an offence desired by the instigator.115 It is considered to be a form of indirect participation as an instigator does not carry out the objective elements of the underlying hostile act in question, but if they do, then they will be considered to be a coperpetrator.116 Furthermore, it needs to be established that the instigation was a clear contributing factor to the conduct of other persons who perpetrated the hostile act. While it is not necessary to demonstrate that the hostile act would not have been perpetrated without the involvement of the individual instigator, it is sufficient to demonstrate that the instigation was a factor that substantially contributed to the conduct of the person or persons perpetrating the hostile act.117
As for the subjective elements of instigation, it must be established that the instigating individual intended to provoke or induce the commission of a hostile act, or was aware of the substantial likelihood that the commission of a hostile act would be a probable consequence of his acts. Furthermore, instigation differs from ordering in that they have different tests for causation. Whereas ordering requires, that hostile acts be committed in furtherance of the order, or that the order has a direct and substantial effect on the commission of the hostile act,120 instigation merely requires that it be clear and contributing factor of the commission of the hostile act. Instigation need not cause in the physical perpetrator the intention to commit the hostile act. Instead, all that need be established is that the instigation strengthens the perpetrator's will or resolve to commit the hostile act by providing additional motives or reasons for its commission.121 In this regard, by itself, instigation can be considered to be to be a form of indirect participation in hostile acts. Given that it is not punishable per se, it is suggested that loss of protection from attack may not occur unless it is having a 'direct and substantial effect' on the commission of hostile acts, in which case its duration is temporary to the extent that loss of immunity occurs only for such time as there are hostile acts being committed.
Planning an act
This section contributes to a general framework of target analysis by suggesting that the objective and subjective elements of planning the perpetration of an offence as developed in international criminal law may be used to identify and target the core leadership122 as well as the political or ideological cadre 123 and the auxiliaries of an organized armed group. It is suggested that where there is intelligence that establishes these elements, then where planning can be considered to be 'an integral part' of a specific and co-ordinated military operation, then this may thus lead to a deprivation of immunity from attack. However, given that the majority of approaches discussed below base liability for planning on a choate offence, i.e.
actual perpetration or attempted perpetration, then it is suggested that by itself, planning may : instigation 'does not necessarily presuppose that the original idea or plan to commit the crime was generated by the instigator. Even if the principal perpetrator was already pondering on committing a crime, the final determination to do so can still be brought about by persuasion or strong encouragement of the instigator'. 122 British Army COIN FM (n 56): The role and attributes of military and political leaders are generally organizing and planning at the strategic and operational levels. They provide the strategic direction and ideological impetus to the movement that underpins the activities of auxiliaries, the political cadre, combatants and the mass base of support; See also US FM 3-24, above n.452, 1-61. 123 British Army, COIN FM, ibid., 2-15: The political or ideological cadre is not necessarily formally constituted, for example, into a political party or extremist group, but in substance, its function is to assist with the organization, planning and direction necessary for the implementation of the overarching political or ideological goals that stem from the leadership; See also US FM 3-24, ibid, 1-65.
only result in temporary loss of protection unless and for such time as it can be considered to be 'an integral part' of a specific and co-ordinated military operation is in motion.
In terms of the objective elements, planning as a mode of perpetration is very similar to the notion of conspiracy, but what makes planning different is that a planner designs the commission of an act that is perpetrated by others. International criminal law has taken slightly divergent approaches the conditions under which planning the commission of offences can be regarded as a distinct form of accessorial liability. The first approach is that planning constitutes a distinct form of criminal liability punishable per se, that is, even if the planned crime is not in fact committed. 124 The second approach is that liability for the planning of criminal offences can arise on the basis acts that are yet to be committed, primarily attempts to commit crimes. 125 The third approach is that planning or the preparation of a crime is only punishable when followed by the actual commission of the planned offence 126 The objective elements of planning are that one or more persons design the criminal conduct. 127 Those who are liable for planning do not participate in the implementation of the criminal plan, and so strictly-speaking planners are considered to be accessories because of their participation in the formulation of a criminal plan rather than subsequent implementation and perpetration.128 However, if planners participate in its implementation, then they would be regarded as perpetrators or co-perpetrators. Planning is therefore a mode of accessorial liability to be applied where an individual's role is limited to participation in the process of formulating a hostile plan rather than perpetrating the belligerent act or in some way contributing to its execution. Furthermore, there must be evidence or intelligence that an individual's planning or formulation of a plan substantially contributes to the perpetration hostile activities.129
124 Prosecutor v Kordić and Čerkez (n 116) 386: 'an accused may be held criminally responsible for planning alone' because 'planning constitutes a discrete form of responsibility under Article 7(1) of the Statute'. It is important to qualify this by stating that only the planning of large-scale international crimes may be punishable per se, due to the gravity of these crimes and the demands of policy to prevent them. In contradistinction, for crimes of lesser gravity, there is the argument that the doubt should be resolved in favour of the accused, and so the planning of lesser crimes may not be punished per se. As for the subjective elements of planning, it needs to be established that an individual intended the hostile act in question to be committed'. 130 All that needs to be demonstrated in this regard is that a person plans a hostile operation with an awareness of the substantial likelihood that a hostile act will be committed in the execution of that plan. Planning activities performed with such awareness are to be regarded as accepting that hostile act,131
and so where there is evidence that an individual's plan substantially contributes to the perpetration of hostile activities then planning can be considered to be an 'integral part' of a specific and co-ordinated military operation. Where this can be demonstrated then this may thus lead to a deprivation of immunity from attack for such time as it can be considered to be 'an integral part' of a specific and co-ordinated military operation is in motion.
Ordering an act
Whilst ordering may in one sense appear to be a form of indirect perpetration, international criminal law regards ordering as a form of indirect participation that results in accessorial rather than principal liability.132 Ordering is subjectively different from principal modes of liability in that it need not be established that a superior giving an unlawful order has the particular intention required for the underlying criminal act executed in pursuit of that order.
Rather, the superior merely needs to be aware of the substantial likelihood that the physical perpetrators will act with the intention required by the particular crimes that have been executed. As such, ordering does not constitute a form of indirect perpetration, as the authority giving the order does not possess the intention of the physical perpetrators. In this regard, by itself, ordering can be considered to be to be a form of indirect participation in hostile acts. Accordingly, the objective and subjective elements of this mode of liability will be set out to distinguish it from the notion of indirect perpetration before extrapolating the elements of this mode of liability to the concept of direct participation in hostilities. In this way, the concept of ordering can be considered to be relevant for targeting the core leadership as well as the political or ideological cadre of an organized armed group.
As for the objective elements, ordering requires no formal superior-subordinate relationship. Rather, it is sufficient to demonstrate that the individual who issued the order had a form of de facto authority to instruct the perpetrators of the act or acts ordered. 133 This means that the individual issuing an order has a significant influence over the perpetrators such that they are compelled to obey. 134 De facto authority to 'instruct' the physical perpetrators may be implied from the circumstances and as such there is no particular form in which an order must be given. 135 An order can be given orally or in writing and it can be made expressly or implicitly. Accordingly, the existence of an order can be proven by circumstantial evidence.136 Furthermore, each intermediary who is at least in a position of de facto authority and who passes on the order is considered to be reissuing the order, and can thus be held liable for ordering the commission of the crimes.137
In order to target an individual for ordering the perpetration of a hostile act a causal link between the act of ordering and the physical perpetration of a crime needs to be demonstrated. It is not necessary to demonstrate that the offence would not have been perpetrated in the absence of the order.138 According to one approach, perpetrators must commit the crimes in execution or furtherance of an order, although, according to another approach, it is sufficient if the physical perpetrators attempt to commit the crimes in execution or furtherance of the order. 139 With regard to the subjective elements of ordering, it must be established that individual giving the order intended the hostile act to be committed, or was aware of the substantial likelihood that the commission of the hostile act would be a consequence of his acts, and so ordering with such awareness is to be regarded as accepting the hostile act.140
This state of mind does not need to be explicit. Rather, it may be inferred from the circumstances, but in such circumstances it must be the only reasonable inference from the evidence.141
Given that ordering it is not punishable per se, it is suggested that loss of protection from attack may not occur unless there is some indication of de facto authority over the physical perpetrators as well as some indication of a causal connection between the order and the hostile acts. However, once hostile acts have been committed, then given the existence of a relationship of de facto authority over the perpetrators, then it is reasonable to suggest that this hierarchical relationship involving de facto authority of the core leadership as well as the political or ideological cadre of an organized armed group will persist for the duration of the hostilities. This is because from a doctrinal point of view, it will be necessary to degrade the organizational structures that sustain hostilities, and therefore it is not only the core leadership, but also intermediaries who are in a position of de facto authority to reissue orders 
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Criminal law modes of liability set out evolving conceptual frameworks for connecting individuals to crimes across a multiplicity of fact patterns and therefore suggest ways of linking individuals to hostilities as well as the membership of organised armed groups.
Doctrinal developments relating to 'full-spectrum', 'counterinsurgency' and 'stability' operations lend credence to Van Creveld's prediction that 'the armed forces of the world will have to adjust themselves to this situation by changing their doctrine, doing away with much of their heavy equipment and becoming more like the police'.142 This discussion has contributed towards an framework that better suits these changes in the strategic environment Factors include include whether there has been an increase in and a spread of armed clashes over territory and over a period of time. In this regard account ought to be taken of the casualty level and the extent of the destruction caused by the fighting as well as the effect of hostilities on civilians, for example by forcing them to flee from combat zones and whether civilians and/or civilian objects have been subject to direct or indiscriminate attacks.An assessment should also be made as to whether there has been any increase in the size of government armed forces as well as evidence of mobilization and distribution of weapons among both parties to the conflict. Indicators in this regard include troop and unit deployment numbers, the formation and change of front lines between belligerent parties and whether high intensity 'weapons of war' such as 'heavy weapons and other military equipment, such as tanks and other heavy vehicles' have been used. Also relevant to the issue of mobilization of forces and matériel is whether military tactics and formations have been employed such as the mass deployment of forces to a crisis area, the closure of roads and the blocking and encirclement of conurbations and the use of mortar or artillery fire against them. Another key factor that is relevant to the intensity criterion is whether international organizations such as the UN Security Council have become involved over concerns about the situation presenting a threat to domestic, regional and international stability, and whether any resolutions have been passed in this regard. Boškoski suggests that an account of the intensity or seriousness of hostilities can take place at a 'more systematic level'. This may involve an analysis of the policy decisions, orders and instructions that lie behind 'the way that organs of the State, such as the police and military, use force against armed groups' at the various levels of conflict.
organized armed group for the purposes of common Article 3, there needs to be 'some hierarchical structure' and furthermore the 'leadership requires the capacity to exert authority over its members '.147 147 Boškoski, ibid, 196, 199: Boškoski sets out five indicative and interrelated criteria of what constitutes a sufficient degree of organization for there to be an armed conflict for the purposes of IHL. Firstly, there must be some form of command structure in place. This may be evidenced by the existence of what can be regarded as a 'general staff' or a 'high command' which can issue political statements and communiqués as well as organize personnel, logistics and weapons, such as by appointing personnel to specific roles or tasks, giving orders and authorizing military operations. Furthermore, IHL can only apply where there is a command structure which allows the 'high command' to receive reports from all operational units within the chain of command and to establish and disseminate internal regulations that set out the hierarchical organization and structure of the armed group in terms of roles and duties at each level of the chain of command. Secondly, for a group to qualify as being 'organized', it must have the ability to carry out military operations in an organized fashion and control territory. Factors to consider in this regard are whether the group has the ability to establish a 'unified military strategy' so as to be able 'to conduct large scale military operations', whether it has 'the capacity to control territory' (rather than actually controlling it), and whether 'there is territorial division into zones of responsibility'. Furthermore, there must be some evidence that commanders and operational units can 'coordinate their actions' and effectively disseminate 'written and oral orders and decisions'. Thirdly, an organized armed group is one which has a sufficient level of logistical and organizational capabilities. For example, an assessment is to be made of a group's ability to recruit new members and to provide them with military training and to control and organize the supply of weapons and uniforms as well as its ability to link and co-ordinate all levels of the chain of command through a communications system. Fourthly, an armed group must also be sufficiently organized so as to ensure a level of discipline and demonstrate the ability to implement common Article 3. Factors relevant in this respect include whether there is a system of internal regulations and disciplinary rules in place as well as mechanisms such as proper training and supervision to ensure that they are disseminated to members of the organized armed group. Fifthly, Boškoski suggests that an 'organized' armed group is one with the ability to "speak with one voice" in the course of political negotiations. In this regard, account may be taken of the group's capacity 'to act on behalf of its members in political negotiations with representatives of international organisations and foreign countries' as well as its ability to negotiate and conclude agreements such as ceasefire or peace accords'.
